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INTRODUCTION
On August 5, 1992, a year before Roger Williams University
School of Law was to take in its first class, Richard Marshall was
shot in the chest at 98 Waverly Street in Providence, Rhode Is-
land. Two weeks later, Edson Toro, then sixteen years old, after
consulting an attorney, surrendered to authorities. Toro was
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
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charged with assault with intent to commit murder and carrying a
pistol without a license. The Rhode Island Family Court waived
and transferred jurisdiction to the Superior Court for prosecution
as an adult. He was convicted of assault with intent to commit
murder and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, with ten
years to serve, five years suspended, and five years probation.
This is a story about Edson Toro and his quest for justice, which
ended on April 29, 2003, when his conviction was vacated. The
State has indicated that it will not seek to retry Mr. Toro, who has
completed service of the ten years imprisonment. "Justice delayed
is justice denied."'
Edson Toro testified at his trial that he acted in self-defense -
that Marshall pulled a gun on him and, as they wrestled for con-
trol of the weapon, it went off and Marshall was shot. The trial
judge, who did not believe Toro's testimony, refused to give the
self-defense instruction. Any first-year law student knows that the
trial judge cannot judge the credibility of the testimony - it's not
his job. If there is any evidence of self-defense, a self-defense in-
struction must be given. The jury decides the credibility of the
witnesses, not the judge.
How could it take the courts so long to correct such an obvious
mistake?
Edson Toro doggedly pursued justice. He appealed the convic-
tion to the Rhode Island Supreme Court; he filed a post-conviction
proceeding in the state court and appealed that decision to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court; and he filed a federal habeas corpus
petition and appealed that decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. The legal theory consistently used by
the courts to avoid addressing the obvious error by the trial judge
was "procedural default" - that defense counsel had not submitted
a self-defense instruction in writing as required by Rule 30 of the
Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2
1. "[T]he 40th clause of Magna Carta provided that justice be to none
denied or delayed. 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 57-58 (3d
ed. 1922). This ancient tenet of the law has been capsulized in the expression
'justice delayed is justice denied.'" Strachan v. Colon, 941 F.2d 128, 129 (2d
Cir. 1991).
2. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 30. Generally, within the context of this
article, "procedural default" refers both to the failure to raise a claim at the
proper time and to the failure to raise a claim in the proper manner. Re-
quirements for contemporaneous objections, limitations on the time period
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This article will discuss the concept of "procedural default,"
but there is far more to this story. It is intended to be a retrospec-
tive examination of the errors in this case. Why did the system fail
Edson Toro? How could he serve ten years in prison before such an
obvious error could be addressed? Are there lessons to be learned
by a "post-mortem" examination and analysis of the case?
It has been said that one reason for the founding of Roger Wil-
liams University School of Law, the only law school in Rhode Is-
land, was to provide an institution that would be in a position to
critically examine the administration of justice in Rhode Island,
without being dampened by special interests, with the goal of im-
proving the system. This Article attempts to critically explore Ed-
son Toro's case and the application of the procedural default
doctrine.
I. THE TRIAL3
The State's theory of the case was that Toro shot Marshall for
no apparent reason, other than to "make a name for himself." The
within which claims must be made, and requirements that objections, re-
quests or motions be raised or made in a specific manner, e.g., in writing or
with an affidavit attached, are the sorts of procedures imposed by statutes,
rules or case law that, if not complied with, may result in a "default" or
"waiver" of the underlying error. Specifically, Mr. Toro's alleged "procedural
default" was in not making the request for a self-defense instruction in writ-
ing, as required by Rule 30.
3. The author of this Article was appointed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit to represent Edson Toro in his appeal of the
denial of his federal habeas corpus petition. The factual information con-
tained in this Article is taken entirely from the public record in the case and
is not supplemented by any information obtained through confidential com-
munications between lawyer and client. See Toro v. Wall, No. 01-2478, 2002
WL 31159486 (1st Cir. Sept. 27, 2002); Trial Transcript, State v. Toro, R.I.
Super. Ct. (July 11-14, 1994) (No. P2/93-0837) [hereinafter Trial Transcript];
Sentencing Transcript, State v. Toro, R.I. Super. Ct. (Sept. 13, 1994) (No.
P2/93-0837A) [hereinafter Sentencing Transcript]; Motion for Post Conviction
Relief Transcript, Toro v. State (March 9, 2000) (No. PM-97-5454) [hereinaf-
ter Round One Hearing Transcript]; Hearing Transcript, Toro v. State, R.I.
Super. Ct. (July 15, 2002) (PM/00-22) [hereinafter Round Two Hearing Tran-
script] (all on file with author). The author, however, has chosen to avoid te-
dious specific citations to the record and transcripts. A constructive critique
is intended, not useless and inappropriate criticism of anyone involved in the
case. There is no doubt in the mind of the author that everyone involved in
the case was trying to do the right thing. That is precisely why an historical
examination of the case, factual and legal, may be useful.
20041
458 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:455
defense theory of the case was that Toro acted in self-defense after
Marshall pulled a gun on him, and that Marshall was shot with
his own gun during the struggle.
Mr. Marshall, who was twenty-two years old at the time of the
shooting, testified that on August 5, 1992, at around 5 p.m., he
went to 98 Waverly Street to visit friends. On his arrival, he met
eight or nine of his friends in front of the house, including Edson
Toro. After greeting them, within four or five minutes, Marshall
went to the side of the house to urinate. While urinating, he heard
someone behind him say "watch this." He turned and saw Toro
four to five feet away pointing a gun at him. Two shots were fired,
one right after the other. One shot went through his arm and into
his chest. At the time this happened, Marshall's eight or nine
friends were within eight feet of him. Two of his friends took him
to the hospital, where he remained for four or five days. The bullet
is still in his chest; it was not removed.
According to Marshall, Toro was his friend, who he had
known for two to six years, and there had been no trouble between
them. Marshall testified that Toro had no reason to shoot him. He
said Toro shot him to prove a point, to make a name for himself, to
get a reputation.
Edson Toro's version of the events surrounding the shooting
were quite different. Toro, who was sixteen years old at the time of
the shooting, testified that he first met Marshall in 1991 in front
of James Shorts' house. Toro saw a motorcycle in front of Shorts'
house, and he sat on it. Marshall came up from behind Toro and
was angry that Toro was on his motorcycle. Marshall pointed a
gun at Toro. Shorts came over and vouched for Toro. Marshall put
the gun away and left on his motorcycle.
On June 12, 1992, nearly two months before the shooting, an
incident occurred on Cranston Street that was the cause of the
shooting on August 5. Toro was sitting on a porch in front of a
house as Marshall was walking down the street toward him. Mar-
shall had a bag in his hand. A police car was coming down the
street behind Marshall. Marshall turned, saw the police car and,
when he was four or five feet from Toro, tossed the bag in Toro's
lap. Believing that the bag contained drugs, Toro got up, walked
away, and threw the bag in the sewer. Meanwhile, the police offi-
cer, who Toro recognized as Officer Green, stopped his car, got out,
and stopped and frisked Marshall.
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Toro did not see Marshall again until August 5. During the
interval between June 12 and August 5, Toro had been to New
Jersey with his mother visiting relatives. On the fifth, Toro was in
front of 98 Waverly Street with a number of his friends. There
were a lot of people around. Marshall arrived, greeted a few peo-
ple, and then demanded that Toro pay him money for the "dope"
that Toro had thrown away. Toro replied that he was not going to
go to jail for Marshall, and that he was not going to pay him. Mar-
shall became upset and went around the side of the house. Mar-
shall turned around and reached for a gun at his waist,
underneath his shirt. Toro, who was sitting on the stairs, saw a
small, chrome gun in Marshall's hand. Toro jumped up, grabbed
Marshall's wrist and arm, head-butted him, and pushed him
against the wall. During the struggle, the gun went off. Only one
shot was fired. Marshall crouched down and dropped the gun.
Toro kicked the gun away from Marshall, picked it up, ran off, and
threw the gun into the sewer. He was scared, and he ran home.
Later, when he heard the police were looking for him, he called an
attorney, and, on August 21, he surrendered himself to the au-
thorities.
On cross-examination of Marshall, Toro's counsel inquired
about Marshall's employment at the time of the shooting. Mar-
shall said that he worked for Slam Entertainment, a New York
company owned by his cousin Flipper. Marshall was a production
manager and promoter and ran the Providence office of Slam En-
tertainment, which promoted various artists and musicians. His
office was in his home; he lived with his parents in an apartment
complex. Marshall said he first started working for his cousin in
1991, and that he was paid on a commission basis. At the time of
the shooting, he had a beeper that he used for production matters,
although the beeper was in his girlfriend's name. Marshall admit-
ted that, in his statement to the police, he told them he worked for
Service Master, a cleaning company, but that information was
wrong. He had recently been laid off, although he had worked for
Service Master for two years.
Marshall also stated that he told the police the gun was a
nine millimeter weapon, because his doctor told him that the bul-
let inside his chest was a nine millimeter bullet. Although at trial
he could not remember what the gun looked like, in his statement
to the police he said the gun was small and shiny. Marshall ad-
2004] 459
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mitted that on three prior occasions he had entered pleas of nolo
contendere to charges of assault, driving with a suspended license,
and obstructing a police officer.
The prosecution called James Shorts as a witness. Shorts had
known Marshall for five years and Toro for a year or two; he was a
friend of both of them. On August 5, Shorts had been with Mar-
shall prior to the shooting, but they separated when Marshall
went to Waverly Street and Shorts went to get some food. After
Shorts got his food, he cut through the lot next to 98 Waverly
Street and saw Toro coming up the block and Marshall urinating
at the side of the house. There were lots of people on the stairs
and in front of the house. Shorts passed by them and was crossing
the street when he heard someone say "watch this." He then heard
two shots. Shorts turned around and saw people running, includ-
ing Toro, who had something in his hand that looked like a gun.
Shorts said that a lot of people were in the street, playing ball and
hanging around, and he didn't know who said "watch this" or
whether the statement was connected with the shooting. Shorts
said that he was drunk at the time and that he doesn't remember
the incident very well; he has a problem with alcohol and memory.
Shorts also testified that Marshall carries a gun sometimes,
but that he did not know whether Marshall had a gun on August
5. He recalled an incident involving Marshall and Toro about nine
months before the shooting. It occurred in front of Shorts' house.
Marshall was bullying Toro, testing him, and pointed a gun at
him. Shorts intervened, vouching for Toro, and Marshall left. He
never saw Toro with a gun prior to the day that Marshall was
shot.
Shorts was declared a hostile witness and the prosecutor im-
peached him with a prior statement given to the police. The perti-
nent part of the prior statement was:
I got across a lot towards 98 Waverly Street that's Neil
Degales's house. I saw Richard Marshall taking a piss in
the alley next to the house. Edson Toro came up and said,
"watch this" and he came up with a gun. He fired two
shots at Richard and he was running around like he
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didn't know what to do next. He then ran down Waverley
towards Bucklin.4
Although admitting that he signed the statement, Shorts said
that he did not read it before he signed and that he did not say
those things to the police. The statement was dated October 1,
nearly two months after the shooting. Marshall asked Shorts to go
to the police station and give the statement. Marshall gave Shorts
a ride to the station and waited for him in the hallway as he
talked to the police.
Another prior statement, testimony given by Shorts at the
waiver hearing in Family Court, was consistent with his trial tes-
timony.
Three other witnesses, all police officers, were presented by
the prosecution. Officer Figueiredo responded to the hospital
on August 5 and briefly talked to Marshall, who told him that he
had been shot by "Edison." Officer Katsetos testified that he took
the statement from Shorts at the police station and that Shorts
signed it. The officer had no specific recollection of the statement.
The third officer to testify was Detective Wight, the investigating
officer in the case.
About a week after the shooting, Detective Wight took a
statement from Marshall and visited 98 Waverly Street. Marshall
told him that no one who was present at the time of the shooting
would be able to give a statement because no one saw the shoot-
ing. When Detective Wight asked Marshall for the names of peo-
ple who were there, Marshall told him Dwayne, Rick and Butch
were there, but that he did not know their last names and'he
could provide an address only for Dwayne. When Detective Wight
spoke to four to six people at 98 Waverly Street, they all said they
had nothing to tell the police. Detective Wight told Marshall that
if he found anyone who had seen the shooting, to bring them to the
police station. It was nearly two months later that Marshall
brought Shorts to the station.
At the end of the State's case, the judge granted a motion for a
judgment of acquittal of the count charging possession of a firearm
without a license. The information specifically charged possession
of a nine millimeter handgun and the judge, prosecutor and inves-
4. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 131.
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tigating detective all agreed that there was no way that a doctor
could determine the caliber of a bullet that had not been removed
from the body.
The defense, in addition to Toro, called two witnesses. Victor
Pichette, a self-employed private investigator, testified that he
checked the Yellow Pages in New York and Providence and found
no listing for Slam Entertainment. He also checked the Providence
white pages, as well as records at City Hall and in the Secretary of
State's office, and found no listing for Slam Entertainment.
Stanley Gregory, Jr., testified that he owned Service Master and
that Marshall had worked for him from September 1986 until the
end of 1987, but did not work for him during the five years prior to
the shooting.
The prosecution called Officer Green in rebuttal. Although Of-
ficer Green knew both Marshall and Toro from seeing them on the
street, he had never stopped and frisked Marshall. He had no spe-
cific recollection of June 12, 1992.
In his closing argument, defense counsel argued that Toro
was acting in self-defense. The judge, however, gave no instruc-
tions on self-defense. Before the jury was sent out, defense counsel
requested an instruction on self-defense. The exchange was as fol-
lows:
Defense Counsel: Judge, the only thing that I request is
that the jury be given some instruction that a person is
entitled to use reasonable force.
The Court: Did you give it to me in writing? I asked for
the instruction in writing. Did you ask for that instruc-
tion?
Defense Counsel: Judge, we had gone back and forth on
whether I was going to request that. I just ask that they
be given an instruction somewhere along those lines that
he is entitled to use reasonable force to repel an attack
and that -
The Court: I don't think self-defense is a part of this case,
quite frankly, based on any view of the evidence. 5
5. Id. at 372, 373.
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On July 14, 1994, Edson Toro was convicted in Rhode Island
Superior Court of assault with intent to commit murder. On Sep-
tember 13, 1994, at the sentencing hearing, the trial judge further
elaborated on his disbelief of the defense case. He stated: "I found
Mr. Toro's testimony was totally unbelievable, in fact, ludicrous.
How he thought that anyone would believe the version that he
told this jury in this court about the shooting, how it happened, I
can't even fathom."6
The trial judge's comments at the time of refusing to give the
self-defense instruction and at the sentencing hearing quite
clearly show that the reason for the refusal was that he did not be-
lieve the testimony of Edson Toro.7 A refusal to give an instruction
based on such a rationale is clearly erroneous. This mistake on the
part of the trial judge was the first of many errors affecting Toro's
right to present a defense, his right to a jury trial, and his free-
dom. The self-defense instruction was required as a matter of
Rhode Island law.
The law relating to self-defense in Rhode Island is that:
[O]ne may defend oneself whenever one reasonably be-
lieves that he or she is in imminent danger of bodily harm
at the hands of another. Such a person, having the fear,
need not wait for the other to strike the first blow. How-
ever, such a person must use only such force as is rea-
sonably necessary for his own protection. The permissible
degree of force used in defense of oneself varies with the
particular set of circumstances in which he or she acts,
but in no set of circumstances may one apply more than
that degree of force necessary to prevent bodily injury.
One who uses excessive force is held accountable for his
or her actions .... It is clear then that "the very essence
of the defense of self-defense is how the defendant per-
6. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 3, at 11.
7. On two separate occasions in the later state post-conviction proceed-
ings, the trial judge again made it quite clear that the reason he did not give
the instruction was his disbelief of the testimony of Edson Toro. For his pre-
cise comments, see the discussion of the state post-conviction proceedings in-
fra Parts IV and VII.
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ceived the situation at the time of the incident in ques-
tion."8
It is also clear under Rhode Island law that once the defen-
dant introduces some evidence of self-defense, the burden is on the
prosecution to negate that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.9
As for the responsibility of the trial judge to give a requested
instruction on self-defense, it was stated in State v. Butler:10
The state concedes that there was limited evidence
raising the issue of self-defense, but argues that the trial
justice was not impressed thereby. This argument, how-
ever, completely misconceives the trial justice's obliga-
tion. The fact that a trial justice does not believe the
accused's defense does not alter his obligation to submit
such defense to the jury under proper instructions.
However slight and tenuous the evidence may be on
which the self-defense hypothesis is advanced, it is never-
theless there for the jury's consideration, and the fair
trial concept requires that the jury consider it under an
appropriate instruction.
However tenuous such hypothesis may be, the weight of
the evidence on which it rests is exclusively for the jury.11
II. THE APPEAL
Edson Toro appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island. He was represented in the appeal by his trial coun-
sel. One of the issues raised was the failure of the trial judge to in-
8. State v. D'Amario III, 568 A.2d 1383, 1385 (R.I. 1990) (quoting State
v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1085 (R.I. 1981)); see also State v. Fetzik, 577 A.2d
990, 993 (R.I. 1990); State v. Quarles, 504 A.2d 473, 475 (R.I. 1986).
9. Quarles, 504 A.2d at 475; State v. Amado, 433 A.2d 233, 237 (R.I.
1981); State v. Baker, 417 A.2d 906, 910 (R.I. 1980).
10. 268 A.2d 433 (R.I. 1970).
11. Id. at 436-37 (citations omitted); see also State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d
958, 961 (R.I. 1995); Fetzik, 577 A.2d at 993; DAmario III, 568 A.2d at 1385;
State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1261-62 (R.I. 1981); State v. Vargas, 420
A.2d 809, 815 (R.I. 1980).
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struct the jury on self-defense. The Supreme Court, on November
4, 1996, dismissed the issue in a paragraph, which read:
The defendant's fifth claim was that the trial justice
erred in failing to give an instruction that a person is en-
titled to use reasonable force in self-defense. This Court
has stated that a trial justice must instruct on self-
defense even if a claim is based on "slight and tenuous"
evidence. State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I. 1995)
(quoting State v. Butler, 107 R.I. 489, 496, 268 A.2d 433,
436 (1970)). In this case, however, the requirements of
Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure were not satisfied insofar as defendant failed to file
a written request that the court instruct the jury in this
regard. Thus the issue is waived on appeal. 12
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated the correct standard
regarding the requirement for an instruction on self-defense, but
affirmed the conviction without reaching the merits of the claim
as a result of two errors. The first mistake was an apparent as-
sumption that the reason for the denial of the instruction was that
the instruction was not submitted in writing, 13 rather than the
clear indication from the trial judge's comments at two points in
the trial transcript that the reason for the denial of the instruction
was his disbelief of Toro's testimony. The second mistake was the
conclusion that the requirements of Rule 30 were not satisfied.
Rule 30 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during
the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may
file written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in the request. At the same time cop-
ies of such request shall be furnished to adverse parties.
12. State v. Toro, 684 A.2d 1147, 1149 (R.I. 1996).
13. The testimony of trial counsel at the later post-conviction proceeding,
with no disagreement from the trial judge, was that counsel had a written
instruction at the charge conference, but that it was discarded when he
agreed that he preferred the self-defense instruction prepared by the trial
judge. See infra Part VII, for the discussion of the post-conviction proceeding.
This later testimony added context to the statement of counsel at the trial,
when asked by the trial judge if he submitted the instruction in writing, that
"Judge, we had gone back and forth on whether I was going to request that."
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If a defendant relies upon an affirmative defense, or justi-
fication, or matter in mitigation and wishes the court to
instruct the jury with respect to such, he or she shall so
advise the court in writing no later than at the close of
the evidence. No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless the party objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stat-
ing distinctly the matter to which the party objects and
the grounds of the party's objection. Objection shall be
made out of the presence of the jury.14
According to the Reporter's Notes:
The provision requiring a defendant who is relying upon
an affirmative defense, justification, or matter in mitiga-
tion to give the court written notice if he wishes the jury
to be instructed with respect to such... assures that the
trial judge will be fully advised of the nature of the de-
fenses being relied upon and will have appropriate oppor-
tunity to instruct the jury accordingly. 15
The Reporter's commentary parrots the reasons typically
given for the existence and enforcement of contemporaneous objec-
tion rules. If the trial judge is alerted to a claim of error at the
time of its occurrence, he has the opportunity to minimize the risk
of error and avoid the need for a mistrial, thus contributing to fi-
nality in criminal litigation.16 But such a rationale isn't applicable
to the circumstances of Mr. Toro's trial.
Before the trial began, defense counsel made the judge aware
that his client would be arguing self-defense. Opening statement
by defense counsel laid out a story of self-defense. The cross-
examination of Marshall and the direct examination of Toro fo-
cused on the defense of self-defense. In closing, defense counsel
argued that his client had acted in self-defense. Self-defense had
been discussed during the charging conference. Self-defense was
the only defense presented. From the beginning of the trial until
14. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 30.
15. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 30 reporter's note.
16. See, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503 (2003); Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-89 (1977); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443, 458-59 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); State v. Parker, 472 A.2d 1206,
1210 (R.I. 1984).
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its conclusion, the trial judge was aware that the defense was rely-
ing on a theory of self-defense.
At the conclusion of the instructions, before the jury was sent
out for deliberations, defense counsel objected to the lack of any
self-defense instruction and orally requested such an instruction.
The procedural default relied on by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court was not the failure to object to the instruction given or to
request a self-defense instruction, but it was the failure to request
the instruction in writing. The trial judge knew throughout the
trial that Toro was relying on the theory of self-defense. There was
no additional information that would assist him in determining
the propriety of a self-defense instruction based on the evidence
presented. The trial judge refused to give the self-defense instruc-
tion because he didn't believe the testimony of Edson Toro, not be-
cause he was unaware of a self-defense claim or lacked the
knowledge or ability to craft a self-defense instruction. Under the
circumstances, Toro's asserted due process right to an instruction
on self-defense "should not depend on a formal 'ritual. . . [that]
would further no perceivable state interest."'17
Moreover, there is no Rhode Island decision that directs flaw-
less compliance with Rule 30 in the unique circumstances of this
case. On the contrary, there are Rhode Island decisions that ex-
cuse compliance with the rule.'8 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court's erroneous reliance on Rule 30 to avoid Mr. Toro's meritori-
17. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 366-67 (2002) (quoting Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 124 (1990) (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 349
(1984) (quoting Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958)))).
18. See State v. Fetzik, 577 A.2d 990, 993 (R.I. 1990) (stating that Rule
30's time limit was intended to promote the orderly conduct of trial, and was
never intended to be an unalterable condition in the face of an otherwise
meritorious request for an instruction of considerable importance to a defen-
dant); State v. Amado, 433 A.2d 233, 237-38 (R.I. 1981) (holding that when a
basic constitutional right is at issue, the Rhode Island Supreme Court will
review the alleged error, notwithstanding defendant's failure to make a
timely objection at trial, if defendant's failure to object was not a deliberate
trial tactic and if the alleged error consists of more than harmless error);
State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 815-16 (R.I. 1980) (stating that although fail-
ure to request a specific instruction does not excuse the trial justice from his
general obligation mandated by statute to instruct the jury with respect to
those rules of law that of necessity must be applied to the issues raised at
trial in order for the parties to secure a fair trial, on appeal a defendant may
not challenge the trial justice's failure to so instruct the jury unless at trial
he objected to the charge as given).
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ous claim continued the unlawful detention of Edson Toro. Were
the facts and the applicable law clearly elaborated in the Appel-
lant's Brief Was the court overly protective of the Superior Court
Rules, or of the finality of the underlying conviction?
After Toro's conviction was affirmed on appeal, he filed a state
claim for post-conviction relief and a complaint against his counsel
with the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Rhode Is-
land.
III. THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD COMPLAINT
Based on the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court af-
firming his conviction, Mr. Toro filed a complaint with the Disci-
plinary Board in which he alleged that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to file a written request for an in-
struction on self-defense. Toro's trial counsel, in a letter to the
Chief Disciplinary Counsel dated January 22, 1998, responding to
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, stated:
Prior to instructing the jury, there was a charging confer-
ence between the Court, the prosecutor and myself. Dur-
ing the charging conference [the trial judge] read a
boilerplate self-defense instruction. I had, in fact, pre-
pared an instruction on self-defense, however, I liked the
instruction that [the trial judge] had indicated he was go-
ing to give and consequently, I did not file my requested
instruction .... [Aifter the closing arguments, [the trial
judge] instructed the jury on the law but failed to give a
self-defense instruction. I asked to approach the bench
and requested that a self-defense instruction be
given .... [T]he trial justice responded, "I don't think
self-defense is a part of this case, quite frankly, based on
any view of the evidence."... In essence, I felt that I had
been somewhat tricked by the Court since I clearly re-
member [the trial judge] reading his boilerplate self-
defense instruction to me and my indicating that I was
satisfied with that instruction during the charging con-
ference. Nevertheless, it is true the instruction was not
given and it is likewise true that I objected to the trial
judge's failure to give the self-defense instruction. How-
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ever, the Court was of the mind that self-defense played
absolutely no role in this case. 19
This letter from Toro's trial counsel to the Disciplinary Board
was attached as an exhibit to his state petition for post-conviction
relief and to his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. From
this point, every court to consider Mr. Toro's claims was aware of
trial counsel's account of the charge conference.
IV. THE STATE POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDING
(ROUND ONE)
On November 12, 1997, Edson Toro filed, in state court, a pro
se petition for post-conviction relief,20 alleging that the trial judge
erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense and that trial
counsel was ineffective because he failed to request a self-defense
instruction in writing as required by Rule 30. The petition was as-
signed to the trial judge, who, on December 11, 1998, more than a
year later, appointed counsel to represent Mr. Toro. 21 After the
passing of another fifteen months, a hearing took place on March
9, 2000. Court-appointed counsel filed a report, appeared at the
hearing, and recommended that the application for post-conviction
relief be dismissed with prejudice. 22
The basis of court-appointed counsel's recommendation was
that the trial judge clearly indicated on the record that the in-
struction was not given because the judge did not believe that it
was warranted by the testimony presented at the trial. During the
hearing, the trial judge again stated that the reason he did not
give a self-defense instruction was that he did not believe such an
instruction was warranted on the facts of the case. The application
for post-conviction relief was denied with prejudice.
19. Letter from Trial Counsel to Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island (Jan. 22, 1998) (on file with au-
thor).
20. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-9.1-1 to -9 (1997) (procedures for a prisoner
to petition for post-conviction relief on a claim that his conviction was in vio-
lation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of
the State of Rhode Island).
21. Counsel was appointed under the authority of Rhode Island General
Laws section 10-9.1-5.
22. Round One Hearing Transcript, supra note 3, at 3.
2004]
470 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:455
In the quixotic hearing before the trial judge, court-appointed
counsel and the trial judge focused on Toro's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim and the actual reason for the denial of the in-
struction - that the trial judge did not feel that the testimony
supported a self-defense instruction. Since this was the reason for
the denial, there was no ineffective assistance on the part of trial
counsel from the alleged failure to submit a written request for
the instruction. There was, however, no consideration given to Ed-
son Toro's consistent, repeated argument that the judge erred in
concluding, because he did not believe the testimony of Toro, that
the self-defense instruction was not warranted.
The delay in resolving the state post-conviction proceeding
and the failure to examine the crux of Toro's complaint were ar-
guably the result of assigning the petition to the trial judge, who
apparently felt no urgency to resolve the issues and superficially
examined the allegations, perhaps because he was convinced that
his resolution of the issue at trial was correct. If so, then maybe
the trial judge saw Toro as an inmate with little to do to amuse
himself other than file frivolous petitions collaterally attacking
what the judge regarded as a valid conviction. As for court-
appointed counsel's failure to address the argument regarding the
self-defense instruction on the merits, was it inadvertence, negli-
gence, confusion regarding his role, or ineffective assistance of
counsel? 23 Did the trial judge and appointed counsel pay too little
attention to Toro's claims because they knew he had not been suc-
cessful in the Rhode Island Supreme Court? Whatever the reason,
Toro's meritorious claims were ignored once more.
Toro then proceeded on two fronts. He filed an appeal in the
Rhode Island Supreme Court of the denial of his state petition for
23. The federal courts and the United States Congress have concluded
that there can be no ineffective assistance of counsel in state or federal post-
conviction proceedings because the federal constitutional right to counsel
does not extend to post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (1996). However, the State of Rhode Is-
land provides the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. R.I. GEN.
LAws § 10-9.1-5 (1997); see also Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).
Thus, in Rhode Island, there is a state right to the effective assistance of
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.
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post-conviction relief, and he resorted to the "Great Writ,"24 given
special protection in the United States Constitution. 25 Toro filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island.
V. APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF THE STATE PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Toro appealed the denial of the petition for post-conviction re-
lief to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The Rhode Island Public
Defender's Office was appointed to represent Mr. Toro on appeal.
On October 22, 2001, the Rhode Island Supreme Court handed
down an opinion, in which it stated:
On appeal, the petitioner argues that the hearing justice
failed to comply with the procedures set forth by this
court in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000) (per
curiam). Those procedures require that if a hearing jus-
tice agrees with the assessment of a petitioner's attorney
that the post-conviction relief petition has no arguable
merit, then the justice must conduct a hearing with the
petitioner present. If a justice decides to permit the at-
torney to withdraw, then the petitioner must be allowed
the opportunity to proceed pro se, or the court must ap-
point new counsel to proceed with the petition. Id. at 135,
136-37. In this case, the hearing justice failed to follow
these procedures. 26
Because of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's concerns re-
garding the fairness of the procedures followed in the post-
conviction proceeding, the denial of the petition for post-conviction
relief was vacated and the case was remanded for a hearing in ac-
cordance with the dictates of Shatney v. State. But, once again, the
merits were not addressed and further delay ensued.
24. '[Tihe Great Writ, habeas corpus... 'the most celebrated writ in the
English law.'" Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1963) (citing 3 BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES 129).
25. "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended ... ." U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.
26. State v. Toro, 785 A.2d 568 (R.I. 2001).
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VI. THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING
On November 7, 2000, Mr. Toro filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island. The issues raised included
the denial of due process of law, specifically the denial of the abil-
ity to present a defense by the trial judge's refusal to instruct the
jury on self-defense, and the denial of the right to have his defense
heard and determined by a jury.27 Toro also alleged ineffective as-
sistance of counsel resulting from the failure of trial counsel to file
a written request for an instruction on self-defense. A United
States District Judge assigned the case to a United States Magis-
trate Judge for a report and recommendation.
The Magistrate Judge, finding the ineffective assistance of
counsel issue unexhausted at the state level (the state post-
conviction proceeding was still pending),2s offered Toro the option
of withdrawing that claim, without prejudice, and proceeding with
the self-defense instruction claim, or having his entire petition de-
nied without prejudice pending state exhaustion on all grounds. 29
Toro opted to withdraw the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
On Toro's claims regarding the failure to give a self-defense
instruction, the U.S. Magistrate Judge, without appointing coun-
27. Petitioner's Pro Se Brief at 3, Toro v. Wall, No. 01-2478, 2002 WL
31159486 at *2 (1st Cir. 2002) (No. 00-561 ML) [hereinafter Petitioner's Pro
Se Brief]; see also Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge at 2
(No. 00-561ML) (Sept. 12, 2001). The question of whether the federal ques-
tion, here the federal due process argument regarding the failure to give the
self-defense instruction, has been presented to the state courts for purposes of
the exhaustion requirement, is one governed by federal law standards. See
infra note 28. As explained in New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman:
There are various ways in which the validity of a state statute
may be drawn in question on the ground that it is repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States. No particular form of words or
phrases is essential, but only that the claim of invalidity and the
ground therefor be brought to the attention of the state court with
fair precision and in due time.
278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928).
28. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner will not be
granted unless the petitioner has exhausted the remedies available in state
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000). If a prisoner has the right under state law
to raise the question presented, he shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
available remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2000).
29. Report and Recommendation at 2, Toro v. Wall, No. 00-561 (D.R.I.
Sept. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Magistrate's Report].
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sel or conducting an evidentiary hearing, filed a report and rec-
ommendation on September 12, 2001, recommending that the pro
se petition be denied. He concluded: "This court is precluded from
hearing this petition on its merits because the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court's determination of procedural default on this issue is
an independent and adequate state ground."30
On October 1, 2001, the U.S. District Judge entered an order
accepting the magistrate's report and recommendation and deny-
ing the petition.3 1 The District Judge denied a certificate of ap-
pealability on November 9, 2001.32
The U.S. Magistrate Judge and the U.S. District Judge were
wrong. Did the lack of counsel for Mr. Toro or the lack of an evi-
dentiary hearing result in the U.S. Magistrate Judge paying too
little attention to Toro's claims? Did the U.S. District Judge read
the twenty-two page handwritten "Petitioner's Brief' prepared by
Mr. Toro in support of his petition?33 Did either the Magistrate
Judge or the District Judge look beyond the Memorandum and
Supplemental Memorandum prepared by the State in support of
its Motion to Dismiss the habeas petition? Did they look beyond
the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Mr. Toro's di-
rect appeal?
A federal judge may issue a writ of habeas corpus freeing a
state prisoner if the prisoner is in custody in violation of the Con-
stitution of the United States. The right of a defendant in a crimi-
nal trial to assert self-defense is a fundamental right, and failure
to instruct the jury on self-defense when the instruction has been
requested and there is sufficient evidence to support such a charge
30. Id. at 10.
31. Toro v. Wall, No. 00-561ML (D.R.I. Oct. 1, 2001) (District Court Or-
der adopting Magistrate's Report and Recommendation).
32. Toro v. Wall, No. 00-561ML (D.R.I. Nov. 9, 2001) (Memorandum and
Order denying certificate of appealability). An appeal from the denial of a
federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not be taken unless a judge
issues a certificate of appealability, certifying that the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)
(2000).
33. Mr. Toro has learned a lot about the law and advocacy during his
lengthy incarceration. His brief in support of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was well-written and factually and legally accurate, and contained the
appropriate citations. It is the opinion of the author of this article that the
brief and other papers submitted by Mr. Toro were on par or better than
many similar documents prepared by lawyers.
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violates a criminal defendant's rights under the due process
clause. 34 This right flows from indisputable federal law that a de-
fendant in a criminal trial has a right to "a meaningful opportu-
nity to present a complete defense." 35
A necessary corollary of this holding is the rule that a de-
fendant in a criminal trial has the right, under appropri-
ate circumstances, to have the jury instructed on his or
her defense, for the right to present a defense would be
meaningless were a trial court completely free to ignore
that defense when giving instructions. 36
Federal cases have recognized that "a defendant is entitled to
an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists
evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor," in-
cluding the defense of self-defense.37
Toro's due process right to a trial by jury was also violated by
the trial judge's failure to give the requested self-defense instruc-
tion. The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant the oppor-
tunity for a jury to decide guilt or innocence. 38 "A necessary
corollary is the right to have one's guilt determined only upon
proof beyond the jury's reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged." 39
[Iln a jury trial the primary finders of fact are the jurors.
Their overriding responsibility is to stand between the
accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Govern-
ment that is in command of the criminal sanction. For
34. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 852 (6th Cir. 2002); Davis v. Strack,
270 F.3d 111, 131-33 (2d Cir. 2001); Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 875-76
(6th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Means v. Solem, 646 F.2d 322, 332 (8th
Cir. 1980); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d
Cir. 1991).
35. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); see also Lee v.
Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375-76 (2002); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
294 (1973).
36. Taylor, 288 F.3d at 852.
37. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1988); see also Steven-
son v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 322 (1896); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.
37, 56 (1996) (stating that the the right to have the jury consider self-defense
evidence may be a fundamental right).
38. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
39. United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1988); see In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 25
(1st Cir. 1999).
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this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a
judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come for-
ward with such a verdict,.... regardless of how over-
whelmingly the evidence may point in that direction. The
trial judge is thereby barred from attempting to override
or interfere with the jurors' independent judgment in a
manner contrary to the interests of the accused.40
In the context of self-defense, it is not the proper role for a
court:
to stand in the place of the jury, weighing competing evi-
dence and deciding that some evidence is more believable
than others. Rather, it is for the jury, with the proper self
defense instruction, to decide whether the amount of force
was justifiable or unjustifiable .... Only the jury has the
responsibility of arriving at a final determination of []
guilt or innocence, and a [] court cannot usurp this role.41
As stated in a slightly different context, "[wihere [the right to
a jury trial] is altogether denied, the State cannot contend that
the deprivation was harmless because the evidence established
the defendant's guilt; the error in such a case is that the wrong
entity judged the defendant guilty."42
The trial judge's failure to give a self-defense instruction is a
constitutional error remediable under the federal habeas corpus
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a de-
cision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)
40. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73
(1977); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986); United States v. Ar-
gentine, 814 F.2d 783, 788 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. White Horse, 807
F.2d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317,
1321-22 (5th Cir. 1983).
41. Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1999).
42. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.
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resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
sented in the State court proceeding.
The Supreme Court clarified the standard of review required
by § 2254(d)(1) in Williams v. Taylor.43 The "contrary to" and "un-
reasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have independent
meaning.44 A state court decision will be "contrary to" clearly es-
tablished precedent if the state court either "applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,"
or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from our precedent."45 The state court decision will be an
"unreasonable application of' clearly established Supreme Court
precedent if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but ap-
plies it unreasonably to the facts of the particular prisoner's
case."
46
The deprivation of Toro's fundamental right to present a de-
fense, by the failure to give a self-defense instruction, was con-
trary to California v. Trombetta47 and Mathews v. United States,48
and the deprivation of Toro's right to have his defense presented
to a jury was contrary to United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co.49 and Rose v. Clark.50 Moreover, the "unreasonable applica-
tion" clause applies to a due process challenge to the trial judge's
failure to give a self-defense instruction when merited by the evi-
dence. 51 Toro's claims also fit under subsection (2) of § 2254(d) in
43. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
44. Id. at 404.
45. Id. at 405-06.
46. Id. at 407-08; see also O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir.
1998).
47. 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). ("We have long interpreted this [due proc-
ess] standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.").
48. 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988) (holding that a defendant is entitled to a jury
instruction on any defense presented whenever there is sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find in the defendant's favor, even if one
or more elements of the crime are denied by the defendant).
49. 430 U.S. 564, 573 (1977) (holding that a trial judge is barred from
"overrid[ing] or interfer[ing] with the jurors' independent judgment in a
manner contrary to the interests of the accused").
50. 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (holding that it is reversible error for a judge to
enter a judgment of conviction or to direct the jury to deliver such a verdict).
51. Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 133 (2d Cir. 2001).
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that the failure to give a self-defense instruction resulted in a "de-
cision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in the light of the evidence."52
A. The Issue of Procedural Default
An effort to obtain federal review will be rejected on the basis
that there is an independent and adequate state procedural
ground precluding the exercise of jurisdiction.5 3 A judge may not
issue a federal writ of habeas corpus if an adequate and independ-
ent state law ground justifies the prisoner's detention, regardless
of the federal claim.
As to the role of adequate and independent state
grounds, it is a well-established principle of federalism
that a state decision resting on an adequate foundation of
state substantive law is immune from review in the fed-
eral courts. The application of this principle in the con-
text of a federal habeas proceeding has therefore excluded
from consideration any questions of state substantive law,
and thus effectively barred federal habeas review where
questions of that sort are either the only ones raised by a
petitioner or are in themselves dispositive of his case. The
area of controversy which has developed has concerned
the reviewability of federal claims which the state court
has declined to pass on because they were not presented
in the manner prescribed by its procedural rules. 54
A "state ground" often asserted as an adequate, independent
basis for holding a state prisoner in custody is a state law "proce-
dural default," such as the prisoner's failure to raise his claim at
the proper time. 55 Wainwright v. Sykes held that federal constitu-
tional claims made to state courts, like claims under state law,
52. Id.
53. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 635-36 (1875); see generally
STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1195-97 (8th ed. 2002).
54. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1977) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
55. In his dissent in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), Justice Black,
remarking on such a result, stated: "I find it difficult to agree with the
soundness of a philosophy which prompts this Court to grant a second review
where the state has granted one but to deny any review at all where the state
has granted none." Id. at 552 (Black, J. dissenting).
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must meet the requirements of state procedural rules, as long as
the rules do not discriminate against federal claims.5 6 Procedural
rules determining the time when and the mode by which claims
must be asserted are designed to alert the court to problems at a
time and in a manner that facilitate correction of errors and pro-
motes finality of judgments. The violation of such rules provides a
basis for denying review of alleged errors, whether the issue is
raised on appeal or in a collateral proceeding. There is an added
problem when a federal court is reviewing a decision of a state
court - due regard for the constitutional distribution of power be-
tween the federal and the state judicial systems.
Wainwright v. Sykes reversed Fay v. Noia and declared a new
"cause and prejudice" standard for federal review after state pro-
cedural default - the federal claim will be reviewed only if the ha-
beas petitioner can establish acceptable cause for the
noncompliance with the procedural rule and actual prejudice re-
sulting from the alleged constitutional violation.5 7 However, "[t]he
procedural default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional
requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to con-
serve judicial resources and to respect the law's important interest
56. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90.
57. Id. at 88-89. In Fay v. Noia, the Court "reject[ed] ... the suggestion
that the federal courts are without power to grant habeas relief to an appli-
cant whose federal claims would not be heard on direct review in this Court
because of a procedural default furnishing an adequate and independent
ground of state decision." 372 U.S. 391, 434 (1963). The Court stated,
[Wihile our appellate function is concerned only with the judgments
or decrees of state courts, the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts is not so confined. The jurisdictional prerequisite is
not the judgment of a state court but detention simpliciter ....
Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that right
is denied and a person confined, the federal court has the power to
release him. Indeed, it has no other power; it cannot revise the state
court judgment; it can act only on the body of the petitioner.
Id. at 430-31. However, the Court did "recognize a limited discretion in the
federal judge to deny relief to an applicant" who "has deliberately by-passed
the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his
state court remedies." Id. at 438. But, "[a] choice made by counsel not partici-
pated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief." Id. at 439. For
an account of the journey from Noia to Sykes, see Peter W. Tague, Federal
Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court
Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-19 (1978).
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in the finality of judgments."58 If the state procedural rule does not
promote these objectives, it will not be followed. 59
Under certain conditions, the state's assertion of procedural
default is not an "adequate" independent ground for the decision
and does not bar assertion of the federal law claim. Whether the
procedural default is adequate to bar the federal claim is a matter
of federal law.60 Situations in which an otherwise valid state
ground will not bar federal claims include: (1) where the proce-
dural rule in question fails to serve a legitimate state interest;61
(2) where the state procedural rule was not "firmly established
and regularly followed;"62 (3) where the prisoner had good "cause"
for not following the state procedural rule and was "prejudiced" by
not having done so;63 and (4) where the constitutional violation
probably resulted in the conviction of one who was actually inno-
cent.64 Edson Toro's alleged circumstances, even if there was a
procedural default, fit rather clearly within three of these excep-
tions and arguably within the fourth.
1. Failure to Serve a Legitimate State Interest
Under the circumstances of Toro's case, the inadequacy of
procedural default to preclude review of the federal right follows
from "the general principle that an objection which is ample and
timely to bring the alleged federal error to the attention of the
trial court and enable it to take appropriate corrective action is
58. Massaro v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1693 (2003).
59. Id. In Massaro, the Court was reviewing a claim of procedural default
in a federal post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Second
Circuit had found that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be
raised on direct appeal of a conviction, or it was procedurally forfeited. The
Supreme Court disagreed, finding that "requiring a criminal defendant to
bring ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal does not pro-
mote theO objectives [of the procedural default rule]." Massaro, 123 S. Ct. at
1693.
60. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002); Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415, 422 (1965).
61. Lee, 534 U.S at 387.
62. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991).
63. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
64. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 496 (1986).
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sufficient to serve legitimate state interests, and therefore suffi-
cient to preserve the claim for review here."
65
The facts in Toro's case are remarkably similar to those in Lee
v. Kemna, where the defendant on trial for first-degree murder
presented an alibi defense, which surfaced at each stage of the
proceedings (opening statement, examination of witnesses, and
closing argument). This was his only defense. However, at some
point during the third day of trial, the alibi witnesses failed to re-
turn to the courtroom. Lee's counsel orally moved for a continu-
ance to find the witnesses. The trial judge denied the motion,
stating that it looked as though the witnesses had in effect aban-
doned Lee, that the hospitalization of the judge's daughter would
prevent him from being in court the next day, and that he would
be unavailable on the following business day because he had an-
other trial scheduled. In his federal habeas petition, Lee argued
that the refusal to grant his continuance motion deprived him of
his federal due process right to a defense. 66
Toro, on trial for assault with intent to commit murder, de-
fended on the ground of self-defense, which surfaced at each stage
of the proceedings (opening statement, examination of witnesses,
and closing argument). This was his only defense. At the close of
the instructions, counsel orally requested a jury instruction on
self-defense. The trial judge denied the request, stating that, "I
don't think self-defense is a part of this case, quite frankly, based
on any view of the evidence."67 In his federal habeas petition, Toro
argued that the refusal to instruct on self-defense deprived him of
his federal due process right to a defense. 68
In Lee, the state appellate court determined that Lee had pro-
cedurally defaulted his claim based on his failure to comply with
state rules requiring that a motion for a continuance be in written
form accompanied by an affidavit addressing the factual showing
required by the rule. The motion for a continuance was made
orally at trial and the factual reasons for the request "were either
covered by the oral continuance motion or otherwise conspicuously
65. Lee, 534 U.S. at 378 (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 125
(1990) (quoting Douglas, 380 U.S. at 422)).
66. Id. at 367-71.
67. Trial Transcript at 372-73.
68. Petitioner's Pro Se Brief, supra note 27, at 6.
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apparent on the record."69 The trial judge, therefore, was made
aware of the problem and the underlying facts, with a timely re-
quest for a resolution of the problem.
In Toro's case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined
that Toro had procedurally defaulted his claim based on his fail-
ure to comply with Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, which required that requests for instructions on
affirmative defenses be in writing.7 0 The request for a self-defense
instruction was made orally at trial and the factual reasons sup-
porting the request were conspicuously apparent from the argu-
ments of counsel and the testimony at trial. The trial judge was
made aware of the problem at a point in time when it could be cor-
rected.
In Lee, the Court found that three considerations, in combina-
tion, led to the conclusion that the asserted state grounds were in-
adequate to block adjudication of Lee's federal claim. First, when
the trial judge denied Lee's motion, he stated a reason that could
not have been countered by a perfect motion for continuance: he
said he could not carry the trial over until the next day because he
had to be with his daughter in the hospital and he further in-
formed counsel that another scheduled trial prevented him from
concluding Lee's case on the following business day.71
In Toro's case, the trial judge denied the oral request for a
self-defense instruction stating a reason that could not have been
countered by a written request for the instruction: he said, "I don't
think self defense is a part of this case, quite frankly, based on
any view of the evidence." 72 The trial judge denied the request on
the merits, although he did, earlier in the colloquy, ask counsel if
he gave him the instruction in writing.73
The second consideration referred to in Lee was that no pub-
lished state decision directed flawless compliance with the state
rules dealing with continuance motions in the unique circum-
stances of that case. Lee's predicament, from all that appeared in
the record, was one that the state courts had not confronted be-
fore. Although there were a number of state court decisions ad-
69. Lee, 534 U.S. at 383.
70. State v. Toro, 684 A.2d. 1147, 1149 (1996).
71. Lee, 534 U.S. at 381.
72. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 372-73.
73. Id. at 372.
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dressing these rules, no prior decision suggested strict application
to a situation such as Lee's.74
There is also no published state court decision directing flaw-
less compliance with Rule 30 in the unique circumstances of Mr.
Toro's case. Toro's precise circumstances had not previously been
addressed by the Rhode Island courts. Although there are a num-
ber of state court decisions addressing Rule 30, they generally deal
with the failure to make an oral or a timely request for an instruc-
tion regarding an affirmative defense. Furthermore, there are
Rhode Island decisions that excuse compliance with the rule.
7 5
In Lee, the third and "most important" consideration ad-
dressed by the Court was that Lee substantially complied with the
state rules and that the purpose of the rules was served by Lee's
oral submissions. Lee's oral request for a continuance, the infor-
mation presented by counsel's arguments, and the testimony at
the trial provided all that the trial judge needed to know to correct
the problem when there was still time to do so.76
Likewise, Toro substantially complied with the state rule, and
the purpose of the rule was served by Toro's oral request. At the
trial, following the jury instructions, counsel requested an instruc-
tion on self-defense. Self-defense is a common affirmative defense
and there are numerous Rhode Island cases discussing the ele-
ments of the defense. Counsel's objection came at a time when the
court could easily have corrected the error and at a time when the
court was fully aware of all information needed to rule on the re-
quest. The information presented by counsel's arguments and the
testimony at the trial provided all that the trial judge needed to
know to correct the error when there was still time to do so. The
legitimate state interest in Rule 30 is met in Toro's case.
If Lee v. Kemna presents an exceptional case in which exorbi-
tant application of a generally sound procedural rule renders the
state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal ques-
tion, then Toro's case also presents such an exceptional circum-
stance.
74. Lee, 534 U.S. at 382.
75. See cases cited supra note 18.
76. Lee, 534 U.S. at 382-84.
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2. State's Failure to Show Strict Adherence to Rule 30 as a
Firmly Established and Regularly Followed State Practice.
In the habeas context, procedural default is an affirmative de-
fense that the state is obligated to raise and preserve or it will lose
the right to assert the defense thereafter. 77 Only a "firmly estab-
lished and regularly followed state practice" may be interposed by
a state as a procedural default that is sufficient to prevent review
in a federal habeas case of a federal constitutional claim. 78 The
prosecutor is "undoubtedly in a better position to establish the
regularity, consistency, and efficiency with which [the court] has
applied [Rule 30] in the past... than are habeas petitioners, who
often appear pro se, to prove the converse." 79 It is fairer to place
the burden of proof and persuasion on the party claiming its exis-
tence.8 0 Therefore, the state should bear the burden of proving the
adequacy of the state procedural bar, i.e., that it is "regularly fol-
lowed," in order to preclude federal habeas review.81
In its Supplemental Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss Petitioner's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the
State argued the plain language of Rule 30, but did not address
the regularity with which it is applied. Perhaps this was because
there are Rhode Island decisions that excuse compliance with the
rule.8 2 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has not demanded flaw-
less compliance with Rule 30. Since the rule has not been regu-
larly followed, it does not provide an adequate basis for procedural
default that would preclude review of Toro's claims.
77. Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997); Grey v. Netherland, 518 U.S.
152, 165-66 (1996).
78. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991); James v. Kentucky, 466
U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 297 (1964).
79. Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 1999).
80. Id. (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (John W. Strong ed. 4th ed.
1992)).
81. See Mitchell v. Mason, 257 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2001). But see
Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that petitioner
bears the burden of showing that the State did not regularly follow a proce-
dural bar around the time of his direct appeal).
82. See cases cited supra note 18.
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3. Good Cause for Not Following State Rule and Resulting
Prejudice to Toro
a. Cause
As "cause" for not submitting a written instruction, Toro as-
serted that his trial counsel relied on the trial judge's indication in
conference that he would give a self-defense instruction. The Mag-
istrate Judge, in his report and recommendation that was adopted
by the District Judge, found such an allegation of cause insuffi-
cient for two reasons. The first was that trial counsel could still
have filed "a written request for a self-defense instruction regard-
less of the trial judge's comment."8 3 He overlooked the fact that
such a request would have been futile because the judge had de-
termined that the evidence did not support a self-defense instruc-
tion. The second reason he dismissed Toro's allegation was that
there was no transcript of the charging conference and he felt
there was no record to review.84 Toro had attached, as an exhibit
to his petition, the letter written by his trial counsel to the Disci-
plinary Board, which was acknowledged by the Magistrate Judge.
Within that letter, counsel indicated that he had submitted a writ-
ten instruction at the charge conference, but withdrew it when he
liked better the self-defense instruction proposed by the trial
judge.85 All it would take to have a complete record would have
been to hold an evidentiary hearing in which trial counsel would
testify, but no hearing was held and no counsel was appointed.
"The existence of cause for a procedural default [may be
shown by] some objective factor external to the defense [that] im-
peded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule,
[such as] that 'some interference by officials' made compliance im-
practicable."5 6 In Strickler v. Greene, where the prosecutor had an
"open file" policy and counsel failed to make a discovery motion for
exculpatory Brady material, the Court found that:
83. Magistrate's Report, supra note 29, at 9.
84. Id.
85. Letter from Trial Counsel to Chief Disciplinary Counsel 3 (Jan. 22,
1998) (on file with author).
86. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted); see
also Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) (concealment of District Attor-
ney's memorandum by county officials is ample cause for failure to raise jury
challenge).
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[I]t was reasonable for trial counsel to rely on, not just
the presumption that the prosecutor would fully perform
his duty to disclose all exculpatory materials, but also the
implicit representation that such materials would be in-
cluded in the open files tendered to defense counsel for
their examination.8 7
In Mr. Toro's case, it was reasonable for trial counsel to rely
on the judge's representation that he would give a specific self-
defense instruction. It was also reasonable for counsel to believe
that, after the trial judge specifically ruled that he found the evi-
dence did not support a self-defense instruction, the submission of
a written instruction would have been futile.
Even if counsel's reliance on the judge's representation that
he would give a self-defense instruction was not reasonable, inef-
fective assistance of counsel, as alternatively alleged in Toro's pe-
tition, may also be cause for procedural default. But, while
ineffective assistance of counsel is cause for a procedural default, a
claim of ineffective assistance is generally required to be pre-
sented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may
be used to establish cause for a procedural default.88 Otherwise,
the prisoner could avoid the exhaustion requirement with regard
to the ineffective assistance claim by raising the claim for the first
time in federal court as "cause" for the procedural default.8 9 The
87. 527 U.S. 263, 284 (1999).
88. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 (2000); Murray v. Car-
rier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986).
89. The Court's opinions on the issue lead to odd results. In Edwards, the
Court stated that "a procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim can serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas
claim only if the habeas petitioner can satisfy the 'cause and prejudice' stan-
dard with respect to the ineffective-assistance claim itself." 529 U.S. at 450-
51. Since the attorney who represented the accused at trial is often the attor-
ney who represented him on appeal, and since evidentiary hearings are often
required on the alleged deficiencies of counsel, the first time that ineffective-
assistance claims can effectively be raised is in state post-conviction proceed-
ings. Usually, prisoners lack counsel in such proceedings and fail to properly
raise the ineffective-assistance claim. And even if the prisoner has counsel
appointed to assist him, since there appears to be no federal right to counsel
in state or federal post-conviction proceedings, there is no right to claim inef-
fective-assistance of counsel at the post-conviction proceeding as "cause" for
the failure to raise ineffective assistance of counsel in the post-conviction pro-
ceeding. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); Mackall v.
Angelone, 131 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2000).
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result is that ineffective assistance of counsel as "cause" for a pro-
cedural default adds nothing to the prisoner's ability to attack his
conviction, since he is required to directly assert ineffective assis-
tance of counsel at trial in the state proceedings as a reason for
habeas relief.90
Toro's trial counsel represented him on his direct appeal to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in which the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel was not presented. Toro, who was not pre-
sent at the charge conference, had no notice that his counsel had
made any mistake during the trial until after the Rhode Island
Supreme Court opinion in the direct appeal, where the court found
counsel had procedurally defaulted the self-defense instruction is-
sue by failing to request the instruction in writing. In his state
post-conviction proceeding, Toro raised ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel, in that counsel failed to file a written request for
a self-defense instruction, which resulted in procedural default of
the issue. The trial judge presided at the post-conviction proceed-
ing and, after appointed counsel concluded that Toro's petition
lacked merit and recommended that the application for post-
conviction relief be dismissed, denied the petition. However, on
appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case for a
hearing at which Toro would be allowed to proceed pro se. The
state post-conviction proceeding was therefore still ongoing and
unexhausted at the time he filed his federal habeas petition.
In his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Toro
claimed both ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial
judge's indication that he was going to give a self-defense instruc-
The result would be that someone who never received effective assistance of
counsel at any stage of the proceedings could be convicted and sentenced to
confinement, or even death, without being able to obtain federal judicial re-
view of the effectiveness of trial counsel on the ground that an incompetent
lawyer failed to raise the ineffective-assistance claim in post-conviction pro-
ceedings. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1377-78 (5th ed. 2003).
90. In a manner similar to that in which Edwards made an "ineffective-
assistance" claim ineffective as an allegation of "cause" for a procedural de-
fault, Teague v. Lane made the novelty of a constitutional claim ineffective as
.cause" for a procedural default. 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). In Reed v. Ross,
the Court had found that the novelty of a constitutional claim did constitute
cause for procedural default. 468 U.S. 1, 4 (1984). But Teague generally bars
a habeas petition (even absent a procedural default) based on new law, unless
it can fit within one of Teague's very narrow exceptions.
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tion was "cause" for the alleged procedural default. Trial counsel's
defense throughout the trial was self-defense, yet the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court found he failed to follow Rule 30, which re-
quires that self-defense instructions be presented in writing. If
trial counsel did not rely on the trial judge's representation that
he would give a self-defense instruction, then he made a phe-
nomenal mistake that clearly violates the standards espoused in
Strickland v. Washington.91 Such a mistake kept his only defense
from being presented to the jury. These two alternatives are the
only conceivable explanations for counsel's failure. This was not
mere inadvertence that doesn't amount to ineffective assistance.
Nor could there be any reason for "sandbagging"92 on the part of
counsel. Should there be some exception to asserting ineffective
assistance as "cause" in the alternative when it can be determined
from the record that, other than the reason given by counsel, there
is no other explanation for the default?
b. Prejudice
Where an error in a jury instruction is alleged, "it must be es-
tablished not merely that the instruction is undesirable, errone-
ous, or even 'universally condemned,' but that it violated some
right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth
Amendment."93 The question is not whether the trial court gave a
faulty instruction, but rather "whether the ailing instruction by
itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction vio-
lates due process."94
91. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Strickland standard for judging whether the
accused received the effective assistance of counsel is to measure counsel's
performance against an objective standard of "reasonably competent counsel."
Id. at 687. There will be no finding of ineffective assistance unless counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 691.
92. The Court has often used this term, suggesting a tactical reason for
avoiding the issue in state courts and raising it for the first time in federal
courts, as a reason for regarding counsel's procedural default with suspicion.
See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977). For an argument that
there is little risk of sandbagging, see Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfei-
tures of Federal Rights, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1128, 1196-1200 (1986).
93. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973).
94. Id. at 147; see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982).
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In order to show prejudice, Toro must establish three things:
that he was entitled to the self-defense charge as a matter of
Rhode Island law, the failure to give the self-defense instruction
violated due process of law, and that the state's failure was of such
a nature that it was remediable by habeas corpus, given the limi-
tations prescribed by 28 USC § 2254. 95 These issues have been ad-
dressed above,96 but there is an even greater suggestion of
prejudice in Toro's case. Not only did the trial judge refuse to give
a self-defense instruction, precluding the jury from considering
Toro's only defense, but at the end of the charge, the judge told the
jury: "I will tell you as a matter of law, firing a loaded weapon at a
vital part of the body of another, having the projectile go into the
vital part of another person is Assault With Intent to Murder."97
The jury left to begin deliberations at 11:53 a.m. At 3:45 p.m.,
the jury returned with written questions from the foreman. They
were: "Q: (1) What are our guidelines for Intent to Murder? (2)
What are considered vital organs? Arms alone?"98 After instruct-
ing on the reasonable inference to be drawn from the use of a
deadly weapon, the judge charged:
Now, vital organs. If someone fires a weapon and
whether or not it goes-it hits the arm-you asked about
the arm; if it just struck an arm I would say to you that is
not a vital organ, but if it struck the arm and went
through the arm and hit the chest that is a vital organ.
Does that help you any?99
Shortly thereafter, the jury came back with a verdict of guilty
on the Assault With Intent to Murder charge.
The jury, not having been given a self-defense instruction,
still had a problem with the intent issue. This is some indication
that the jury might have found self-defense if it had the option of
so doing.
The magistrate judge, in his report and recommendation,
seemingly addressing the issue of prejudice, stated:
95. Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2001).
96. The right to a self-defense instruction is addressed in Part I; the vio-
lation of due process and the fact that the issue is remediable by habeas cor-
pus is addressed in Part VI.
97. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 372 [emphasis added].
98. Id. at 378.
99. Id. at 379.
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[W]hether the evidence offered by Toro was sufficient to
support a claim of self-defense would first be determined
by the trial judge. If the trial judge found that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support any such affirmative de-
fense, he would not be required to give a specific
instruction to the jury. Here, the transcript of the trial
clearly indicates that the trial judge did not accept the
contention that self-defense was a part of the case. Con-
sequently, there is no basis to conclude that, even if the
requested instruction was made in writing, the trial judge
would have given that charge to the jury. 100
The magistrate judge and the district judge, in accepting the
report and recommendation, never addressed the issue of whether
the trial judge could, in light of the testimony of Toro, decide that
a self-defense instruction was not warranted. The ruling was
based on procedural default.
4. Actual Innocence
A procedural default will not be found to bar consideration of
petitioner's federal claims, even in the absence of a showing of
cause, where the constitutional violation probably resulted in the
conviction of one who was actually innocent. The innocence excuse
for procedural default was mentioned in Murray v. Carrier.'0' The
standard adopted by the Court for resolving the issue of innocence
was stated in Schlup v. Delo to be that, absent the constitutional
error, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted."102 There is no Supreme Court case where the
standard has been met, and few lower court cases have found that
procedural default has been overcome by a showing of actual inno-
cence.'
0 3
100. Magistrate's Report, supra note 29, at 8.
101. 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
102. 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
103. Jordan M. Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV.
303, 341 (1993). The Court recently held "that a federal court faced with alle-
gations of actual innocence ... must first address all nondefaulted claims for
comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural de-
fault." Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004). Such a requirement
ironically makes the "actual innocence" exception to the procedural default
doctrine even less important.
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In view of the credibility issues in self-defense, even though
the jury seemed to have problems with Toro's intent without the
instruction it is unlikely that Toro would fit within this exception,
but he fit within the first three, and one is enough.
VII.THE STATE POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDING
(ROUND Two)
Meanwhile, in the state post-conviction proceeding, following
the remand from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the trial judge
held a hearing on July 15, 2002. In that hearing, the testimony of
trial counsel clearly established that there was no procedural de-
fault on the part of trial counsel, who took a written request for a
self-defense instruction to the charge conference. 10 4 It was also,
once again, made clear that the trial judge did not give the self-
defense instruction because he did not believe the testimony of
Edson Toro. The following colloquy took place:
The Court: Merely because the defendant feels that self-
defense should be charged to a jury, I go on the facts of
the case as I heard them from the witness stand. If I find
there's no evidence which would allow a self-defense
charge, I won't give it. If I do find one, I will give it.
Mr. Toro: I understand.
The Court: In your case, I didn't believe your story - he
turned around and shot himself.10 5
During the cross-examination of his trial counsel, Mr. Toro
elicited the following information:
Mr. Toro: Do you recall what the judge told you during
that charging conference?
104. The testimony of trial counsel was consistent with the letter that trial
counsel sent to the disciplinary counsel in response to Toro's complaint years
earlier - the same letter that was attached as an exhibit to the post-
conviction proceeding at both the state and federal levels. But now, the ac-
count was finally subject to cross-examination by the parties and the trial
judge. The trial judge, by his comments and his silence, took no issue with
the facts as recounted by trial counsel.
105. Round Two Hearing Transcript, supra note 3, at 21.
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Trial Counsel: [M]y recollection was the judge read the
self-defense charge. I was satisfied with it and then, when
he instructed the jury, he didn't give a self-defense in-
struction. As I recall, I approached at that point in time
for an objection because he hadn't given self-defense, and
the judge asked me if I filed a request in writing. At that
time, obviously, I didn't file a request in writing. I was
satisfied with the one you read in chambers, and the
judge at that time said that he did not find there was any
evidence to support a self-defense instruction and he was
not going to give a self-defense instruction. That's my rec-
ollection.
Mr. Toro: Did the judge in chambers indicate to you that
he was going to give the instruction?
Trial Counsel: That was my understanding when he read
it, yes.
Mr. Toro: All right. When the judge requested for you to
submit that instruction in writing, how come you didn't
do it?
Trial Counsel: It was at the bench while the jury was
seated right in the courtroom. I didn't have an instruction
physically on me to submit at that point in time, so that's
why I couldn't submit something. I didn't physically have
one on me at the moment.
Mr. Toro: Isn't it true, responding to David Curtin of the
Disciplinary Board, that you stated you did have the in-
struction prepared already?
Trial Counsel: Yeah, I had drafted a self-defense instruc-
tion. When I heard the Court's self-defense instruction, I
thought it was, frankly, a little clearer than what I had
written up. I intentionally did not file one at that point in
time because I thought it would be clearer, a standard
boilerplate self-defense instruction, and I think actually
when I was responding to the disciplinary complaint, at
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one time I was looking for the instructions and I didn't
find the final instruction. I saw the draft of the instruc-
tion. I didn't see the final, which means I probably mis-
placed it or just tossed it at that point in time. It wasn't
going to be given. I do recall I had a draft of my instruc-
tion in my case file when I was responding to your com-
plaint.
Mr. Toro: During that time when you made the objection,
you approached sidebar. You were specific on that objec-
tion?
Trial Counsel: I believe so. There should be a transcript of
that also.
Mr. Toro: And during that time, was it evident that even
if you did submit that request for instruction, that the
judge wasn't going to give it to you?
Trial Counsel: It seemed pretty clear from his comments
that he found that self-defense was not an issue in the
case.
Mr. Toro: Did you find it fruitless then to submit the re-
quest?
Trial Counsel: For the sake of the record, if I had the re-
quest on me, I certainly would have just handed it in at
that point in time to make the record clearer. I thought I
made the record as clear as I could, but, again, because I
didn't have it on me, I couldn't do that.
Mr. Toro: From that point on, how did you think the jury
could consider the defense of the defendant without any
instruction in regard to this theory of self-defense to the
case?
The Court: Well, he said - I told him I'm not going to give
it, so anything he tried to produce would be fruitless. 0 6
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge continued the
proceeding to a later date.
106. Id. at 27-30.
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VIII.THE APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF THE FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
Edson Toro filed an appeal and a petition for the issuance of a
certificate of appealability in the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, which, on March 29, 2002, granted a certifi-
cate of appealability in an order indicating an interest in having
various issues regarding procedural default briefed on appeal. Fol-
lowing briefing and oral argument, a panel of the First Circuit, on
September 27, 2002, filed a per curiam opinion, "not for publica-
tion - not to be cited as precedent," which stated:
[Tihe appeal cannot (or, at least, should not) be decided
without further factfinding. Accordingly, we vacate the
order appealed from and remand the matter to the dis-
trict court to (1) conduct an evidentiary hearing with re-
spect to what transpired at the charge conference in the
petitioner's original trial, (2) make the necessary findings
as to whether the petitioner's trial attorney was misled by
the trial justice, and (3) make such other findings and
conclusions, and consider such other issues and argu-
ments, as may be appropriate under the circumstances.
We hasten to add, however, that the district court may, if
it so chooses, await a reasonably prompt decision from
the state courts in order to see if the state courts, in the
course of adjudicating the petitioner's ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim, determine whether or not any mis-
leading conduct took place at the charge conference. 10 7
IX. BACK TO STATE COURT - THE FINAL RESOLUTION
Following the death of the trial justice, the state motion for
post-conviction relief, having been taken under advisement, was
considered by the presiding justice of the Rhode Island Superior
Court. On April 29, 2003, the presiding justice entered an order
vacating Mr. Toro's July 1994 judgment of conviction and the sen-
tence entered thereon. By letter dated April 22, 2003, the Rhode
Island Attorney General's Office indicated that it will not seek to
107. Toro v. Wall, No. 01-2478, 2002 WL 31159486 at *2 (1st Cir. 2002).
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retry Mr. Toro. Edson Toro had already completed service of the
ten years' incarceration.
CONCLUSION
There may be two major lessons learned from Edson Toro's
case. The first has to do with the concept of procedural default.
While there may be good reasons for requiring objections to be
made at certain times or in certain ways, the concept of "proce-
dural default" to eliminate review of alleged errors is too often an
excuse used to avoid review of errors on the merits. Everyone
makes mistakes, including lawyers and judges. Some mistakes are
harmful to others. If the mistake and the harm are clear, why not
step in at the earliest possible moment to correct the error?
In Mr. Toro's case, both the error and the harm were clear
from the trial transcript - the trial judge did not give a self-
defense instruction because he did not believe the testimony of
Edson Toro, leaving the jury with no option but to convict. The
only thing that initially was not clear was whether there had been
a written request by counsel at the charge conference for a self-
defense instruction. Why should that uncertainty matter in Toro's
case, when the request for a simple self-defense instruction was
made at a time when it could be given? Why should it take so long
to correct an obvious mistake? Is "finality of judgments" so impor-
tant that we are willing to allow erroneous convictions in its
name? Is it so bad to admit that mistakes are made by lawyers
and judges? Is it about protecting our own - maybe not throwing
stones in a glass house?
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, or the legislature, can cer-
tainly change the application of the procedural default doctrine.
Perhaps the State of Rhode Island should use the Fay v. Noia
standard for review of procedurally defaulted issues, where proce-
dural default is a bar to review of errors only where there has
been a "deliberate by-passing" of state procedures. 08 Or, excep-
tions to the doctrine can be expanded. In Toro's case, since the is-
sue was raised by counsel, the court simply could have addressed
the issue of whether the error was harmful. In the more typical
case, where counsel does not raise the meritorious issue at all,
Rhode Island could address the issue by using a combination of
108. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963); see supra note 57.
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the "plain error" and "harmless error"109 doctrines, except that the
State of Rhode Island, unlike the federal courts1 ° and the vast
majority of state jurisdictions, does not recognize the "plain error"
doctrine."' Without an expansion of exceptions to the procedural
default doctrine, there is an increased need to raise ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claims as the only means to address the under-
lying "defaulted" issue. But, perhaps because such "glass-house"
allegations are so unpleasant, there are myriad obstacles to suc-
cessfully raising ineffective-assistance claims. 1 2
As for federal habeas corpus, it has been said that, "any real-
istic system of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction must be prem-
ised on the reality that the ordinary procedural default is born of
the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience or incompetence of trial
counsel." 113 It is not likely that the United States Supreme Court
will return anytime soon to the Fay v. Noia standard. Rather, the
Court seems content to expand the exceptions to the "procedural
default" doctrine to address the worst errors. This makes it more
important that lawyers keep abreast of federal law and the excep-
tions to the procedural default doctrine," 4 because if they are not,
109. It has been pointed out that the "prejudice" prong of the "cause and
prejudice" exception to the procedural default rule "appears to bear a strong
resemblance to harmless error doctrine." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
117 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also stated: "I disagree
with the Court's appraisal of the harmlessness of the admission of respon-
dent's confession, but if this is what is meant by prejudice, respondent's con-
stitutional contentions could be as quickly and easily disposed of in this
regard by permitting federal courts to reach the merits of his complaint." Id.
at 117.
110. The Supreme Court has indicated that it can reach a federal issue not
raised in the state courts as plain error. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 265
n.5 (1981); Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 502 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring);
see also SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a), 24.1(a); Girardeau A. Spann, Functional Analysis
of the Plain-Error Rule, 71 GEO. L. J. 945 (1983).
111. Patino v. Suchnik, 770 A.2d 861, 867 (R.I. 2001); State v. Rupert, 649
A.2d 1013, 1015 (R.I. 1994); State v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I. 1981).
112. See generally James M. Doyle, The Lawyers' Art: "Representation" in
Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417 (1996) (examining the process of
representing defendants in capital cases); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the
Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer,
103 YALE L.J. 1832 (1994) (examining reasons for deficient representation in
capital cases).
113. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. See generally Daniel Givelber, Litigating State Capital Cases While
Preserving Federal Questions: Can It Be Done Successfully?, 29 ST. MARY'S
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it is unlikely, if not impossible, that the prisoner can address the
"procedural default" of the "procedural defaulted" issue. 115
There may be a second lesson learned by this limited review
of Edson Toro's case. Having looked at the record in Toro's case,
and at the applicable law, the many errors made by many over
many years are apparent. But the reasons for the errors are not. A
few questions have been openly raised. Others have gone unwrit-
ten. Hopefully, many questions have come to the mind of the
reader. One fact remains - Edson Toro served his ten years im-
prisonment before the error was recognized and his conviction va-
cated. In Edson's case, it could be argued that society (certainly
not Edson) was lucky - there was no guilty man who went free,
only the improper imprisonment of a man for ten years.
When an airliner crashes, an interdisciplinary team of experts
descends on the scene, subjects the accident to rigorous study, and
publishes its findings in the ways best suited to using the lessons
of the tragedy to prevent a recurrence. When a patient dies unex-
pectedly during surgery, a detailed post-mortem is performed, and
a peer-review team is mobilized. When an innocent man goes to
prison or death row, and the guilty man who should be in prison
or on death row in his place escapes as a consequence, nothing
equivalent happens.
One by-product of the revolution in DNA analysis has been
the identification of unmistakable miscarriages of justice. Where
the criminal justice system has made episodic use of these find-
ings, in, for example, the National Institute of Justice's Eyewitness
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement,116 the results have been
promising. But as yet, the criminal justice system has developed
no tradition of analyzing its own mistakes. When retrospective
L.J. 1009 (1998) (examining the importance of presenting federal claims in
capital cases). Perhaps the strict procedural default doctrine should place
added pressure on law schools to educate and inspire continuing education
efforts, and on the organized bar to restrict entry into the profession to the
best and the brightest and to require massive amounts of continuing legal
education.
115. See supra note 89 (discussing the allegation of ineffective a§ssistance
of counsel in the post-conviction proceedings as "cause" for failure to raise in-
effective assistance of counsel at trial in the post-conviction proceedings as
"cause" for the failure to raise the underlying defaulted issue at trial).
116. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 178240,
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT III (1999).
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analysis occurs at all, it is left to partisan advocates, or the "got-
cha" oriented efforts of journalists. The product of these efforts are
easy to disregard, easy to forget, and hard to translate into the
advances in training, procedure and technology that can prevent
the same tragedy from occurring twice.
Perhaps its time for a University, with a law school and a
criminal justice studies program, to establish the first non-
partisan, academic effort to establish a model system of "accident
analysis" for the justice system. Teams of lawyers, investigators,
trainers, forensic scientists, social scientists, academics and
judges can investigate such questions as: Why was the innocent
man convicted? Why was the guilty man set free? Why was this
battered spouse not protected?
The assumption of such a suggestion is that no productive
tradition of retrospective analysis and self-criticism has been es-
tablished in the legal system because the construction of such a
tradition presents enormous challenges extending beyond the
idea's simple novelty. Institutional and personal careers are in-
volved; sensitive issues of confidentiality arise. Nevertheless, the
early experience of the National Institute of Justice Working
Groups that wrestled with the problems of DNA evidence, crime
scene investigation, eyewitness evidence, arson investigation and
death investigation indicate the enormous potential for learning
from past errors. As in all important efforts, there will be good
ways to do this and ineffective ways. An underlying belief is that
fifty states, thousands of individual jurisdictions, and tens of thou-
sands of institutional prosecutors, police departments, courts, de-
fender agencies, law schools and continuing legal education
programs should not each have to re-invent the process from
scratch.
How did this happen? Who are the appropriate participants in
a clinical analysis of this mistake? How do you bring all of the ac-
tors to the table? What should they bring with them? How do you
disseminate their findings? What was the impact of specifically lo-
cal conditions and requirements? These are the sorts of questions
a Center for Clinical Analysis of Miscarriages of Justice might aim
to answer - for both the individual cases under study, and for
similar cases that the myriad jurisdictions in our country can prof-
itably analyze in the future.
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